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Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thinking about musical aesthetics (a small but persistent strain in his 
writings) focused primarily on questions of demonstration and proper performance: how should 
this waltz or march sound?  These emphases were part of a modernist-inspired effort to move 
aesthetics down from the heights of Kantian contemplation onto the plain of quotidian practice.  
But Wittgenstein does not so much escape Kant’s formulations as he extends them.  The result 
opens the possibility of elaborating ordinary, even banal, comments about music into complex 
accounts of musical meaning. 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thinking about aesthetics returned continually to the question of 
expression, especially in music.  The topic was an on-and-off preoccupation that 
dovetailed with his more persistent puzzling over how we manage expression in general, 
whether on faces, in melodies, or in language.  Sometimes he focused on expressive 
gestures, sometimes on expressive utterances; sometimes he dealt with forming 
expressive acts and sometimes with recognizing them; sometimes he asked about 
expression through art and sometimes about expression in response to art.  This 
constructive equivocation was principled, not casual.  It was a way of demonstrating that 
there is no clear difference between the terms in any of these pairings—terms that 
needed to be dealt with demonstratively because they were above all demonstrative 
themselves.  For Wittgenstein, both early and late, expression in all its venues occurs as 
the excess of showing over telling.  It always either makes a demonstration or demands 
one or both.  
 It will be useful to begin with a few samples:  
   
 We think we have to talk about aesthetic judgments like “This is 
beautiful,” but we find that . . . we don’t use these words at all. (LA 11) . . . In 
music [we say]: “Does this harmonize?  No.  The bass is not quite loud enough.  
I just want something different. . . .” (LA 7) 
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 If you ask me (Fragst du): How did I experience the theme? – perhaps I 
will say “As a question” (Als Frage), or the like, or I will whistle it with 
expression, etc.  (CV 51, my trans.) 
 
 A theme has no less an expressive countenance (Gesichtausdruck) than a 
face (Gesicht).  
 “The repeat is necessary.”  In what respect is it necessary?  Just sing it, and 
you’ll see that only the repeat gives it its tremendous power.   (CV 52, my 
trans.) 
 
 I have a theme repeated to me and each time played in a slower tempo.  
Finally I say "Now it's right," or "Now at last it's a march" or "Now at last it's a 
dance."  (PI 206) 
 
 Consider also the expression: “Tell yourself it’s a waltz, and you will play 
it correctly.” (Brown Book)1 
 
 This interest in the demonstrative has recently been revived by the literary 
theorist Charles Altieri in his Wittgenstein-inspired essay “Tractatus Logical-Poeticus.” 
Altieri is primarily concerned with utterances, but what he says can apply just as well to 
Wittgenstein’s repertoire of gestures, and in what follows the terms “demonstratives” 
and “demonstrative utterances” should be understood to cover both verbal and 
nonverbal expressions.  “The fundamental demonstrative claim,” writes Altieri, “is that I 
am showing you how I do something so that you can do it, or appreciate it, or at least 
understand its motivation.”  He goes on to give a series of typical demonstrative 
utterances, several of which have a distinctly Wittgensteinian ring: “In English we use 
this expression,” “Try to perform the piece in this way,” “Try this on for size.”2  
 The value of demonstrating the aesthetic value of demonstration itself is to 
deflate the usual paraphernalia of aesthetic judgment and the associated inference of 
meaning. “`A whole world of pain is contained in these words,’” writes Wittgenstein, 
citing a well-worn formula; “How can it be contained in them?” (CV 52).  The metaphor 
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of containment—of the pain as a kind of secret or strange treasure that the reader can 
find by unlocking the text like a coffer—is not so much false as it is surreptitious, a little 
seductive, a little mystifying.  By shifting the venue of aesthetic judgment away from 
psychologizing and transcendentalizing descriptions toward the humble field of practice, 
the standard formulas of aesthetic appreciation can be made to appear as post-facto 
rationalizations, inevitable, perhaps, but of dubious reliability.  The formulas look 
somewhat defensive in this light, as if they were a means of disguising the repeated 
experience that our pleasure in what is most expressive aesthetically tends to make us, 
at least immediately, stumble over what is least expressive in ourselves.   
 A demonstrative theory of the aesthetic diverts interest from the universalizing 
claims associated with terms like “the beautiful” toward the contingencies of social 
negotiation over what works and what doesn’t.  “It is remarkable,” Wittgenstein was 
once heard to observe,  
that in real life . . . aesthetic adjectives such as “beautiful,” “fine,” etc. play hardly 
any role at all.  Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical criticism?  You say: 
“Look at this transition,” or “The passage here is incoherent.”  Or you say, in a 
poetic criticism: “His use of images is precise.”  The words you use are more 
akin to “right” and “correct” (as these words are used in everyday speech) than 
to “beautiful” or “lovely” (LA 3). . . . We don’t find these [latter] words at all, 
but a word used something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated activity” 
(LA 11). 
As speech acts, the kinds of description that Wittgenstein exemplifies here are 
instructions.  They give directions for using certain terms; although they themselves are 
simple, they show how to participate in certain complicated activities.  Their form is that 
of a simple constative utterance but in function they are above all demonstrative.  In the 
production of the aesthetic, the role of these implicit demonstratives will prove to be 
notably out of proportion to their modest appearance.  
 There is surely some truth to the demonstrative theory.  The truth is a practical 
one that arises at the very point where aesthetic theory and aesthetic practice fail to 
coincide—a point, as we will see, that is partly constitutive of the aesthetic itself, at least 
as the aesthetic is understood on the Kantian model “as used in everyday speech.”  
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(Used thus because art in the conduct of ordinary life tends above all to be dealt with in 
Kantian terms, which have become anonymous conventional wisdom.  The aesthetic in 
this regard is a disguised historical artifact.)  As Kant was the first to point out, aesthetic 
judgments formally require agreement from others but cannot actually expect that 
agreement in practice.  Wittgenstein’s account suggests that agreement with the 
aesthetic judgments involved is only incidental.  What actually matters is that we 
recognize the practice of aesthetic appreciation by the kind of judgments—this works, 
this doesn’t; this is right, that isn’t—that the practice employs.  “A person who has a 
judgment doesn’t mean a person who says “Marvellous!” at certain things . . . .That he is 
an appreciator is not shown by the interjections he uses, but by the way he chooses, 
selects, etc” (LA 7).    The medium of aesthetic participation is not exclamatory but 
demonstrative.  Aesthetic involvement is measured not by admiration but by a show of 
competence.3 
 But this curtailment of the aesthetic stories we tell to ourselves, and about 
ourselves, is far from the whole story about the aesthetic.  To some degree, the 
curtailment is itself only an aesthetic fiction, meant, at a moment of high modernism, to 
counter what was felt to be a dubious history of idealizing and Romantic descriptions.  
Beneath the apparent opposition runs a strong current of continuity with the potential 
to affect in substantial ways what we understand by the aesthetic.  In what follows I 
hope to explicate that potential by drawing on Wittgenstein to develop two theses 
about the force of aesthetic demonstratives.  The core of both theses has already come 
up.  Both rest on the recognition that the antagonism of the demonstrative theory 
towards traditional, normative, ultimately Kantian aesthetics is primarily a matter of 
rhetoric and not of what Wittgenstein might have called grammar.   
 First thesis: the demonstrative forms a threshold or medium for the 
transformation of inherited modes of aesthetic response and practice.  Demonstratives 
assimilate the elevation of the aesthetic to the mundane.  In so doing they offer an 
equivocal invitation: to stay one step above exclamation in the minimally articulate 
comfort zone of the demonstrative (“Look at this transition’) or to take the 
demonstrative itself as the basis for something out of the ordinary, or at least less 
ordinary.  Demonstratives in one usage are a kind of shorthand, but in another they are 
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an incitement to further action, in particular to description, which is in turn an 
incitement to interpretation.  The passage from one position to the other, any of the 
others, is absolutely continuous, and any leaps or gaps can in principle be filled in (or 
out). 
 Second thesis: in particular, the demonstrative does not represent a break with 
the core Kantian principles of universality and non-conceptuality in aesthetic judgment, 
although it appears to do so and even seeks to do so.  Instead, the demonstrative 
embodies a reorientation of these criteria that preserves their foundational character in 
terms that subsume or sublate, but never escape, Kant’s own.  
 These theses are at bottom the same thesis viewed from different angles.  The 
best way to approach their relationship is to take the Kantian criteria in turn.  
 Kant grounds aesthetic judgment not in subjective universality per se but in a 
certain fiction of it that the act of aesthetic judgment perpetuates: “[If one calls an] 
object beautiful, one believes oneself to have a universal voice, and lays claim to the 
consent of everyone”—but without actually expecting any proof of that consent.  “The 
judgment . . . does not itself postulate the accord of everyone . . . [but] only ascribes this 
agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule with regard to which it expects 
confirmation not from concepts, but only from the consent of others.  The universal 
voice is thus only an idea.”4 
 The Wittgensteinian demonstrative apparently declines the idea of the universal 
voice.  Kant’s scenario involves a sense of the consent of others that does not require 
the presence or participation of others.  Wittgenstein replaces this with a scene of 
communicative action, a coming to agreement between a speaker and an interlocutor.  
(The speaker and interlocutor may in some cases be the same person, but the 
distribution of roles remains in force.)  The result is certainly a difference in emphasis, 
even in ideology (loosely understood), but it is not a fundamental difference.  Consent is 
still the issue, and so is its purely formal role in the process: Wittgenstein’s 
interlocutors, like Plato’s, always agree where they are supposed to.  The 
Wittgensteinian dialogue is not so much a replacement for the Kantian universal voice as 
a surrogate for it.   
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 Since it is impossible to survey the everyone in the world—past, present, and 
future—the ideal Kantian situation is best described by saying that an aesthetic judgment 
formally supposes consent from anyone who happens to be my interlocutor.  Anyone 
becomes a surrogate or deputy for everyone.  The ideal Wittgensteinian situation scales 
this condition down by no longer demanding the assurance of universality.  Instead the 
aesthetic judgment is best described by saying that it supposes consent from someone 
who happens to be my interlocutor.  But since this act of consent is in principle 
repeatable—I can always demonstrate my judgment to someone else—this scaled-down 
version is not different in kind from its Kantian prototype.  The assurance of 
universality, never literal in the first place, is not negated but distanced or displaced.  
The agreement of someone to whom I demonstrate an aesthetic judgment becomes, 
not an instance or representation of universal agreement, but a metaphor of it.   
 The case with conceptuality is similar.  Kant begins with the down-to-earth 
observation that the minute you deal with objects by means of concepts, “all 
representation of beauty is lost.”  No one can be logically compelled to find something 
beautiful; “Whether a garment, a house, or a flower is beautiful: no one allows himself 
to be talked into his judgment about that by means of any grounds or fundamental 
principles.  One wants to submit the object to his own eyes” (101).  Eventually—to 
make a long story short—Kant will famously propose that aesthetic judgment will be 
coterminous with the recognition of purposiveness without purpose, which is 
coterminous from another angle with the experience of pleasure “without interest.” 
 Wittgenstein again scales these Kantianisms down to more modest modernist 
size.  He grounds aesthetic judgment in contingent habits of pleasure, the implicit 
working knowledge of how to enjoy objects or artworks.  Unlike Kant, he often insists 
that these habits are culture-bound (“The words we call expressions of aesthetic 
judgment play a . . . very definite role in what we call the culture of a period.  To 
describe their use . . . you have to describe a culture” [LA  8].)  But since the enjoyment 
fostered by these habits is non-utilitarian, it does not leave the Kantian orbit.  Instead, 
once again, Wittgenstein repeats Kant’s terms in a metaphorical register, in displaced or 
distanced form.  Non-conceptual judgment “by one’s own eyes” becomes the 
experience of practical self-evidence, the acquisition of the obvious. 
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 The value of this way of reorienting the aesthetic is its pragmatic candor.  The 
aesthetic demonstrative shows what it is actually, practically like to do things without 
concepts and to elicit the consent of others in the process.  The demonstrative thus 
covertly meets Kant’s criteria of subjective universality and non-conceptuality while 
overtly denying their elevated claims.  But actually and practically things rarely end with 
this simple reorientation.  The metaphors of agreement and self-evidence, as metaphors 
will, give the impetus to a proliferating network of other metaphors, tropes, and 
discourses, as well as to further demonstratives.  This impetus may be held in reserve, 
as mere potential, or it may be given free rein, but it will always be present in principle.   
 But the principle is irrepressible; it changes (to speak like Wittgenstein) the 
whole language game.  In principle, then, the demonstrative does more than simply 
show; it enjoins.  In principle the demonstrative may become the descriptive may 
become the interpretive.  The effects of aesthetic judgment run the gamut.  (By what 
means we will soon examine.)   
 As a result, the universal—displaced, distanced—becomes the singular.  The 
non-conceptual—distanced, displaced—becomes the cognitive.  So the principle of the 
aesthetic, as received both from Kant and from Wittgenstein, must be recast again, and 
further: not only that the aesthetic qua universal and non-conceptual becomes the 
aesthetic qua singular and cognitive, but that this becoming is continually repeated within 
the vicissitudes of aesthetic judgment.  The aesthetic is that which becomes singular and 
cognitive by means, and only by means, of originary demonstratives that are neither 
singular nor cognitive. 
 The consequences are perhaps surprising.  They take the form of another 
process, another layer, of distancing and displacement.  The elaboration of the originary 
aesthetic judgment (primitively, “this is beautiful”; more often, as Wittgenstein claims, 
“it’s better this way”) makes accessible the singularity housed in the object of judgment.  
Aesthetic judgments, as already noted, are in principle repeatable and hence non-unique; 
they often begin, and sometimes end, with banalities.  But the aim of these judgments, 
and the demonstratives that carry then, is to link a general mode of pleasure to a 
single—not a specific, but a single—object.  To take the famous Kantian example, any or 
every rose may provoke the judgment “this is beautiful,” but the rose that interests me 
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is always this rose.  The elaboration of the demonstrative makes possible the 
comprehension of the singularity of the singular.  It reveals, retrospectively and 
retroactively, how the force of the singular penetrates even the minimal gestures and 
clichés (“What a beautiful rose!”) that initially conceal the singular in the act of 
recognizing it.5 
 In the long run, this recognition brings about a still further recasting of aesthetic 
judgment as a reversal of consensus.  This is again a matter of transferred, not abolished, 
value.  What is at stake is not a simple denial, but a distanced and displaced form of 
agreement that no longer needs to agree.  Wittgenstein describes this in a passage with 
distinct Kantian overtones: 
 I give someone an explanation, tell him “It’s like when . . .”; then he says 
“Yes, now I understand” or “Yes, now I know how it’s to be played.”  Above all 
he did not at all have to accept the explanation; it’s not as though I had, as it 
were, given him conclusive reasons for why this passage is comparable to this or 
that (dem und dem).  (CV 69, my trans.) 
 This phenomenon of present but deferred agreement, or what we might adapt 
Kant to call consentingness without consent, may find a later resonance in Derrida’s 
classic description of what he called différance.  Understood in communal terms, 
however—terms more or less mandated by the rooted role of consent in the aesthetic 
situation—the aesthetic reversal of consensus is a form of sharing or partaking.  It 
exemplifies the attainment of commonality by division (as by breaking bread), that Jean-
Luc Nancy untranslatably calls partage.  In this relationship there is no need of any 
agreement except the agreement to partake.6   
 Partaking, moreover, implies a kind of common ownership or appropriation, and 
the opening into such “ownness” is another outcome of the elaboration of the 
demonstrative.  At root this is a physical, or more exactly a corporeal, phenomenon, as 
we will see in an autobiographical narrative by Oliver Sacks that emerges as the final 
form of the test case taken up below.  The agreement to partake, it will appear, is 
symbolized, or perhaps more accurately, incarnated, in the presence of a whole, 
specifically a healed, body. 
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 First, however, we need to return to the question of means.  I have been 
speaking freely of the “elaboration” of the demonstrative.  What does that mean?  And 
how should it be—demonstrated?   
 In drawing attention to the value of aesthetic demonstratives, Wittgenstein 
makes an important error, an error of practicality that is ironic given his concern with 
practical circumstances.  I am thinking specifically of his musical examples, perhaps his 
favorite kind in this context, because he assumes both that music is non-conceptual and 
that a certain classical music (to which he as a scion of Viennese high culture is the heir) 
is the assured object of universal aesthetic agreement.  Neither assumption is tenable, 
but that is a part of their interest, since the apparent non-conceptuality of music, which 
is a persistent element in music’s cultural construction, tends to promote a particularly 
vigorous form of demand for universal agreement (people who enjoy the same music 
form an immediate bond).  So the best case for examining these questions would be a 
musical case. 
 Wittgenstein’s cases, however, are, to put it bluntly, just not musical enough.  If, 
for example, it’s a question of playing, say on the piano, one isn’t likely to say simply 
“Play it like this,” or “The bass isn’t loud enough,” but something like this: “Don’t accent 
the cadences too strongly,” or “Bring out the high Ebs a little more,” or “Try to make 
the arpeggios more delicate.   Make them weightless—use a very light touch and don’t 
over-pedal,” or even, “It’s smoother if you finger it 1-5-2-1.”  These directives are a way 
of distributing attention, which, inevitably, becomes a way of establishing meaning. 
 When it comes to listening, the operative statement is likely to favor evocative 
over technical description, although as my “practical” playing instructions already 
demonstrate, the technical and the evocative regularly tend to blur together. In these 
situations a great deal depends on whether the description registers a general 
impression or a specific observation.   
 Take the general first.  Loosely evocative statements are usually sufficient to 
cover general impressions, but their looseness is not free or unlimited. Wittgenstein’s 
“Tell yourself it’s a waltz” is an unlikely directive except for music that may not sound 
like a waltz, for example, the 5/4 second movement of Tchaikovsky’s Pathetique 
Symphony.  With a waltz recognized as such—that is, with most waltzes—a directive 
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such as “Tell yourself the waltz is droopy” (or melancholy, or ironic) is more likely to 
come into play and inform what the listener hears (is able to hear, primed to hear).  The 
standard lore that accumulates around classical composers and popular musicians 
consists primarily of such directives, which establish what one might call listening posts.  
These are frames of reference within which the non-verbal medium of music becomes 
compatible with (but not covered or exhausted by) the norms of verbal intelligibility 
that set the standards for intelligibility in general.  One expectation commonly held of 
music is that it should exceed the verbal, but this can happen only when the occupation 
of a listening post makes a certain verbal framework available to be exceeded.  
 More specific observations move in a more complex and singular direction. One 
might, for example, say, or, more likely, write: “Listen to the way that the sound of the 
English horn, in the folk-like Largo melody of the slow movement of Dvorak’s New 
World Symphony, seems to maintain an acoustically piercing presence in the more 
dramatic second theme, where the oboes sound in unison with the flutes.”  I’ve tried to 
make this instruction as descriptively neutral as possible, but heeding it (even if one 
deletes my “more dramatic”) postulates a complex mode of partaking.  To hear on 
these terms is to assume both that a connection between the themes is important and 
that the medium of this connection is a timbral association that, though certainly 
perceptible, is indirect, almost subliminal.  These assumptions then lead off further in the 
direction of a layered sensorium hovering somewhere between the music as acoustic 
presence and the music as melodic articulation.  
 Consider now, with this chain of demonstratives in mind, the opening of a 
particular classical work, Mendelssohn’s Violin Concerto in E Minor.  The choice, as we 
will later see, is not entirely arbitrary.  We might imagine someone introducing this 
music by saying something like, “It’s full of impassioned lyricism.”  This is in fact the sort 
of general-observation statement often made about the concerto.  It would be useful at 
this point to listen to the music, even if only as a ten or fifteen second excerpt on 
Amazon.com. 
 Now imagine someone who has absorbed the general demonstrative about 
impassioned lyricism and who has reaped the reward of focused attention.  Imagine a 
dialogue between this listener and an interlocutor—or rather several: a Wittgensteinian 
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exchange but not limited to two voices, as it is not limited to “Play it like this” or “Tell 
yourself it’s a waltz.”  The colloquy begins, as such colloquies often do, with a simple 
enough demonstrative—but one that, like the ladder famously invoked at the end of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, is thrown away after its purpose has been served. 
 So: a little group is talking after a concert, or perhaps after sitting together in 
private and listening to a recording.  The talk turns to the concerto, which everyone 
agrees has been played well—“with expression,” as Wittgenstein would say.  It goes 
about as follows. 
 Someone who listens closely—not an expert: At the beginning you could really hear 
the violin gleaming out.   
 A violinist: Yes.  That’s because the soloist plays the whole passage on the violin’s 
E-string, the highest and most brilliant string, while the orchestral violins play on the 
lower strings. 
 Another instrumentalist: Yes; that creates a sense of separation so that the solo 
voice is very distinct; it has its own individual identity.  I mean, it begins by claiming that 
identity and never relinquishes it. 
 Another (or the violinist again): Well, that makes me think of the premium people 
in Mendelssohn’s day placed on individuality—just on individuality as an ideal, not 
necessarily that of exceptional individuals.  People were inclined—it was a new thing 
then—to celebrate the passions of individuals. 
 The second: Yes, but what’s interesting here is that this doesn’t produce a conflict 
between passion and restraint; the whole issue seems to be bypassed. 
 The original listener: Maybe that’s why the violin seems to be free and without any 
feeling of anxiety.  That brings us back to impassioned lyricism. 
 Either of the others: Could be.  But the violin’s freedom is a freedom within limits, 
just as the individual was supposed to be free within limits—enterprising, innovative, but 
not radical.  The thing is that the soloist doesn’t seem to chafe at the limits. 
 And so on. 
 Meaning in this imaginary colloquy is not located in any one place.  Instead it is 
distributed across the whole colloquy and also, like the listener’s attention, across the 
music—and not just the music as heard in the moment under discussion, but also as 
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scored, performed later or in the future, remembered, recorded, broadcast, cited, 
excerpted, and so on.  Access to the whole network of judgments, descriptions, and 
meanings is possible from any point within the network.   
 Possible, and a little more than that: if not exactly necessary, then highly 
recommended.  Without entry into the network sparked by the demonstrative, without 
some degree of elaboration of the initiating judgment, the condition of aesthetic partage 
will be achieved incompletely at best, leaving its participants caught in a crude consensus 
without genuine partaking—precisely the condition that Wittgenstein’s imaginary 
dialogues often rest with.   
 When partage succeeds, on the other hand, the result is a condition of complex 
translatability that does not have to be executed fully to be effective.  For example, the 
description, “You could really hear the violin gleaming out” can be understood as the 
implicit demonstrative, “Hear it as gleaming.”  In turn, the implicit directive also proves 
to be a compressed prescription (or admonition, or suasion): “Tell yourself that it’s 
gleaming and you’ll hear it correctly.”  Most of the epithets used in making aesthetic 
judgments (especially in the early stages of the process) are demonstratives of this type.   
But just insofar as this type of demonstrative is heeded it also opens up the prospect of 
its own obliteration.  The force of the injunction, “hear it as,” dissipates as a more 
complex discourse unfolds—a discourse in which the bare demonstrative quickly proves 
inadequate.  The demonstrative in this situation has to be replaced by a more complex 
textualization, an interpretive intervention, that no longer requires compliance or 
agreement, but simply partaking.  What has to be shared is at least the beginning, and 
therefore the possibility, of this movement beyond the demonstrative.  Yet at the same 
time it is always possible to trace the contents of such textualized statements, which 
represent the music or other object of aesthetic enjoyment in the dimension of the 
singular, back to a possible demonstrative or a possible description.  The only way to 
get the system wrong is not to trust one’s freedom of movement within it.  
 This process of incremental transformation is exactly what happens in my 
imaginary colloquy—which is not really imaginary at all, except in its dramatic form.  To 
be sure, the conversation about the Mendelssohn concerto was invented in order to 
illustrate a possibility, but if it has succeeded in doing so, it has also rendered its own 
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invented status irrelevant.  Itself a higher-order demonstration, the illustration is not 
easy to distinguish either in principle or practice from a “real life” example.  Its 
statements about the concerto are not dummies or place-holders, but genuine claims. 
 To prove the point, consider the Mendelssohn concerto in an unimpeachably 
“real life” context.  This context is that of a memoir, and it will prove doubly 
illuminating: of the failure of trust adumbrated above and of a possible corrective.  The 
failure in this case belongs to the author, the corrective to his readers—or to the text 
that exceeds the author’s grasp in the readers’ hands.     
 Oliver Sacks owes a peculiar debt to the Mendelssohn Violin Concerto, and he 
has told the story many times.  The most detailed account is in his book A Leg to Stand 
On.  After an alpine skiing accident, Sacks discovered that he had lost all feeling in one of 
his legs.  Perhaps this had to do with the fact that he had literally crawled down the 
mountainside, but in any case the feeling—or lack thereof—was very specific: it was as if 
the leg was dead.  While he was recuperating, which proved a long and frustrating 
process, Sacks was given a recording of the concerto, which he listened to repeatedly, 
perhaps even obsessively.  The results were unexpected, to say the least:  
 I had never been a special Mendelssohn lover, although I had always 
enjoyed the liveliness and exquisite lightness of his music.  It was (and remains) a 
matter of amazement to me that this charming, trifling piece of music should 
have had such a profound and, as it turned out, decisive effect on me. . . I felt, 
with the first bars of the music, a hope and intimation that life would return to 
my leg. . . . I felt—how inadequate words are for feelings of this sort!—I felt, in 
those first heavenly bars of music, as if the animating and creative principle of the 
whole world was revealed, that life itself was music, or consubstantial with 
music; that our living moving flesh, itself, was "solid" music.7   
Sacks’s impression became therapeutic when after many hearings ("Every playing was a 
refreshment and renewal of my spirit.  Every playing seemed to open new vistas" [119]) 
and many exhausting bouts of physical therapy, the dead leg abruptly came to life, almost 
as if it were dancing, of its own will, to the music of the concerto, which was also in 
some seemingly indescribable sense its own music: "Mendelssohn fortissimo!  Joy, life, 
intoxicating movement!" (144). 
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 Sacks’s account is most valuable, perhaps, for extending the performative 
network of aesthetic judgment.  It shows—demonstrates—that the object of judgment, 
here the music, is not only the occasion of a demonstrative act but can also itself act as 
a demonstrative.  For the injured Sacks, the Mendelssohn concerto eventually became a 
direct utterance saying, “Feel your leg as alive,” “Feel your leg as music,” “Feel your leg 
as me!”  Musical rhythm and the impression of musical movement became physical 
rhythm and the potential of bodily movement.  In so doing, a certain corporeality 
revealed itself epiphanically.  Sacks feels this in the idea that the flesh is solid music, but 
it is equally possible to feel it in the idea that music shares the solidity of the flesh, for all 
that it seems bodiless in its own right.  The soaring of the opening measures on the E-
string of the solo violin seems like a natural vehicle, a natural embodiment, for that 
perception. 
 But Sacks does not have that perception.  What he has instead is the sense of a 
perplexing gap between the music and its effect on him.  In part perhaps that gap is 
installed in his text by the text’s therapeutic or even redemptive genre.  Sacks wants to 
present what happened to him as a kind of miracle, and so the causes of his healing may 
not be found within the music that healed him, but in some mysterious X that was 
superadded to it.  But in part the gap is there because Sacks does not trust his own 
ears, or, more exactly, because he invokes the standard cliché about the inadequacy of 
words in order to avoid the demand that trusting his ears would impose, the demand, 
that is, to give an account of what he heard.  Hence he remains stuck in a listening post 
that insulates him from the very music that has touched him so closely.  The epithets he 
uses, “charming” and “trifling,” are not only inconsistent with his perception of the 
music as the principle of “Joy, life, intoxicating movement!” but also a poor description 
of the music itself.  Sacks’s descriptions are guilty, disguised demonstratives beyond 
which he is unable or unwilling to go.   
 Yet here the principle of translatability steps in (I use the term pointedly) in a big 
way.  Sacks may be halted, as are the participants in Wittgenstein’s imaginary dialogues, 
in a state of mute consensus and conceptual refusal.  But Sacks’s text is not.  It has 
already gone where he refuses to follow it.  We can get there with a hop, skip, and a 
jump. 
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 Sacks typically avoids dealing with religious questions, although he has an avowed 
affection for his own Jewish heritage, so it is all the more impressive that his account of 
the ideas sparked in him by the Mendelssohn concerto are explicitly sacramental.  When 
he speaks of the “heavenly bars of music” he is simply invoking a cliché, but the dead 
metaphor involved comes back to life as remarkably and as decisively as Sacks’s leg did.  
Recall the subsequent elaboration: Sacks felt, he says, “as if the animating and creative 
principle of the whole world was revealed, that life itself was music, or consubstantial 
with music; that our living moving flesh, itself, was "solid" music.”   
 Sacks may or may not be alluding here to a mystical-theological tradition, with 
ancient roots, that identifies the creative Logos with the music of the heavenly spheres.  
But he is most certainly alluding, even perhaps without meaning to, to the mystery of 
the Incarnation, as the presence of the term “consubstantial” declares: the living, moving 
flesh makes the creative principle of life present in the form of a sacrament, just as the 
living, moving flesh of Christ was God incarnate and, through the miracle of con- or 
transubstantiation, the sacramental means of finding union with the divine.  That the 
passage from incarnation to sacrament came through suffering, death, and resurrection, 
a mortification of the flesh parallel to that suffered by Sack’s leg, gives the music a yet 
more singular quality in Sacks’s apprehension of it.  The “joy, life, intoxicating 
movement!” he hears in the Mendelssohn makes the concerto, and especially its 
beginning, into his own private “Et resurrexit.” 
 Sacks’s elaborations may bring us, by way of conclusion, back to Wittgenstein’s 
occasional observations that aesthetic practices are culture-bound.  The point seems 
obvious nowadays, when referring aesthetic matters to their cultural contexts has 
become so normative that merely making the point no longer carries much weight. But 
it was not always so, and even now is not always remembered.  Sacks in particular 
understands perfectly well that both the Mendelssohn Violin Concerto and the ability to 
enjoy it are specific cultural artifacts.  But insofar as they represent the experience of art 
as art his text endows them with a status as universal as Kant could have wished: from 
the animating principle of the world, which includes everyone, to the living body, which 
everyone living has.   
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 These universals, however, are themselves culture-specific tropes, and their 
significance as such lies not in their content alone, but in the way they are invoked.  
Sacks derives them from banalities, clumsy descriptions verging on exclamations, which 
become the means of demonstrating his “amazement” at the music’s healing power.  His 
elaborations are secreted away in these forms of speech, the small change of 
demonstrative engagement (“Tell yourself it’s trifling and you’ll hear it correctly”).  But 
they are thus sent into exile on the implicit understanding that these awkward, 
inadequate gestures will sooner or later return, at least by some indirect route, in more 
elevated form.  Sacks’s text makes that return especially transparent, even while clearly 
remaining anxious about it.  But what the text demonstrates (another higher-order 
instance) is that the aesthetic, as a cultural formation, is, precisely, that which is bound 
to the elevated by means of the banal.  The aesthetic both helps to constitute the sense 
of banality, or, more kindly, of inarticulate amazement, and helps to free us from it.  Or 
at least it has done so since the mid-eighteenth century, when the concept of the 
aesthetic emerged in response to the cultivation of just this combination of fumbling 
speech and freedom of the imagination.  For Wittgenstein, that still essentially Kantian 
freedom remained largely unspoken, one of those many things one could show but not 
say.  For Sacks, the freedom is, strangely but truly, constrained to become articulate.   
 With Sacks, and not just with him, the Mendelssohn Violin Concerto kicks over 
Wittgenstein’s ladder and runs the gamut. 
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